Is the Study of Politics Best Considered a Science or an Art?
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Is the study of politics best considered a science or an art?
Since its conception as a formal academic discipline, Politics has existed on the fault line between two great fields of enquiry, the sciences and the arts. During the mid 20th century, with the rise of the behavioural movement, a general trend towards the “scientification” of the study of politics could be observed. The origins of this movement can be traced back to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and the writings of Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century (Sanders, 2010). However from the 1970s, there emerged a growing dissatisfaction with behaviouralism and a revival of interest in normative questions, as seen in the writings of theorists such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick (Heywood, 2002). This debate over the nature of politics, which is reflected in the different stages of development of the discipline, continues till date. But before we can decide which position is more relevant, it is important to clarify the distinction between the science of politics and the art of politics. Those who consider the study of politics as a science and those who consider it an art, pursue slightly different aims and apply different methodologies (Berlin, 1979). As Leftwich (2004) puts it, “the study of politics [as] a scientific endeavour... seeks to identify, on an explanatory and probabilistic basis, some general regularities, patterns and processes (if not laws) underlying all politics....”; whereas, “the study of politics [as] a more humanistic, historical, normative and hence non - scientific exercise, [is] concerned with the qualitative understanding and evaluative analysis (and moral judgement) of particular processes at particular times and in particular places.” Leftwich is distinguishing between the arts and sciences by pointing out the difference in their purposes and their aims of enquiry. Science is concerned with identifying repetitive patterns and thereby outlining laws which are universally applicable i.e. can be adapted to all situations. In contrast, art concerns itself with more in-depth analysis of a particular situation and attempts to find solutions particular to that historical or cultural context.
It is evident that an important aspect of the scientific study of politics requires the political scientist to provide descriptions that are generalizable beyond a particular case. The aim here is to use different variables to derive causal relationships which remain constant in any situation. This is done with an eye towards reliability and replication (Bond, 2007). While this process seems to have a wider significance and credibility than art, as art does not appear to be providing any broad solution beyond isolated case studies, science may in effect be restricting the scope of politics. An essential component of science is that another researcher, following the same procedure, is able to arrive at the same result. However, political and social events involve complex human behaviour and interactions which are often autonomous and cannot be viewed as simply reactive to independent variables. Science rests on the principle of rationality and consequently cannot account for the apparent unpredictability of human choices. Further it underestimates the intervention of memory, goal seeking, problem solving etc between the independent and dependent variables. People as a group evolve through a continuous process of learning and causal relationships change simultaneously because, unlike the physical world, the political world is rarely static in the long run. This inherent instability of variables in the social scenario renders the search for regularities or lawful relationships, which was a remarkable success in the natural sciences, an exercise in futility when it comes to explaining social outcomes. In the political arena, this strategy can only hope to explain, at most, some of the conditions which affect these outcomes (Almond and Genco, 1977). In comparison, the constructivist approach (which can be considered an art) incorporates not only the shifting landscape of the social world, but also contingency and human agency into its account (Parsons, 2010).
In addition to the difference of purpose between arts and sciences, which we have discussed above, a further distinction is offered by Lasswell (1958) that may be considered by some as somewhat biased: “The science of politics states conditions; the philosophy of politics justifies preferences.” He distinguishes between “the science of politics” and “the philosophy of politics” on the same grounds as the fact-value dichotomy of logical positivism. He appears to be implying that political philosophy (which, for the purpose of this essay, would fall under the jurisdiction of art) “justifies preferences” in the sense that it provides rationalizations for the personal preferences of the theorist of political philosophy (Horwitz, 1962). Science, on the other hand, uses only facts and empirical data as its tools of analysis. This overt process of analysis minimizes the scope for bias by the researcher (Pierce, 2008). Moreover it promises an impartial and reliable means of distinguishing ‘truth’ from ‘falsehood’ and gives us access to objective knowledge about the political world (Heywood, 2002). However the fact/value dichotomy is not as clearly defined as is assumed here. Values are deeply involved in the identification of facts as well as their description and examination since all political scientists enter research with at least some presumptions about their subject. Hence, it is never entirely possible to reach absolute neutrality in politics. The ambivalence of the fact-value dichotomy leads us to another difficulty. Political activity does not occur in a vacuum or the controlled environment of a scientist’s laboratory. Political decisions do not merely involve objective data, but also value judgements about man and society. Science can facilitate in the critical assessment of these decisions by separating value based elements from the objective elements, thereby making the terms of the choice clear, but it cannot choose (Duverger, 1966). Political scientists only study ‘the how’ and ‘the why’ of political processes and make no effort to answer how these ‘should’ be or present normative statements. So is empirical data, by itself, sufficient for the study of politics? Or are normative statements, which science rejects as being subjective and biased, perhaps an indispensable component of political studies?
This brings us to perhaps the most important or at least the most discernible distinction between the sciences and humanities – the variation in methodology. While art lends itself to a highly qualitative method of research, science tends to use more quantitative methods, to the extent that all facts are usually supported by statistics or numerical data. The use of numeric indicators and large samples makes quantitative research appear more convincing and its findings are generally regarded as consistent and credible. It cannot be denied that quantitative methods decrease the probability of human fallacy and misinterpretations which are common with qualitative methods. Nevertheless, unlike natural science, political science is unable to achieve absolute accuracy. Also it increases the likelihood of manipulation of results as political scientists can fairly easily use a deductive strategy to manoeuvre statistics in a way that verifies their hypothesis. Another problem with quantitative research in politics is that all political concepts cannot be numerically measured. Ideas such as justice and liberty, which form a crucial part of political culture, do not have any predetermined indicators that can be measured using scientific means and thus remain solely within the fold of qualitative research or art. Despite continuous debate throughout the history of the discipline, it is apparent that the scientific study of politics and the artistic study of politics do not always have clear boundaries. Facts in political science cannot claim to be entirely detached from values and art has, perhaps due to its flexibility, been rather influenced by science and often uses facts generated by political science. However art and science, to a large extent, still have very disparate methodologies and pursue dissimilar aims. Science uses only empirical data and overlooks all concepts which do not have numeric indicators and hence cannot be measured quantitatively. While this approach reduces the probability of research bias, it also curtails the scope of political studies. So in practice it appears that, rather than focusing on the issue at hand, science chooses its subject matter in accordance to the requirements of its methodology. In contrast, art uses qualitative research which is more encompassing and studies both observable as well as hidden social phenomena, thus allowing theorists to concentrate on the given issue which, in my opinion, takes precedence over the requirements of methodology. Furthermore, science concludes its investigation at the phase where political concerns are identified and predicted without even attempting to give solutions to the problems it detects. Conceivably, such methods are sufficient if the only purpose of research is to satisfy the curiosity of the researcher, but insofar as the study of politics is intended for the progress of society, it requires a normative component. Art offers precisely that by acting as a guide to policymakers and supplying possible resolutions to the myriad problems facing society today. So I would conclude by suggesting that, despite the prevailing scientific outlook, the study of politics as an art is far more relevant and conducive to the present scenario than the study of politics as a science.
Bibliography
Almond, G. and Genco, S. (1977), ‘Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics’, World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 489-522. Berlin, I. (1979). Against the Current, London, The Hogarth Press, pp. 80-111. Bond, J. R. (2007). ‘The Scientification of the Study of Politics: Some Observations on the Behavioral Evolution in Political Science’, Journal of Politics, November, Vol. 69, Issue 4, pp. 897-907. Duverger, M. (1966). The Idea of Politics, London, Methuen, pp. ix-xiii. Heywood, A. (2002). Politics, Great Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 14-17. Horwitz, R. (1962). ‘Scientific Propaganda: Harold D. Lasswell’, in: H. J. Storing (editor), Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., pp. 225-304. Lasswell, H. (1958). Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?, New York, McGraw-Hill, p. 3. Leftwich, A. (2004). What is Politics?, Oxford, Polity Press, p. 5. Parsons, C. (2010). ‘Constructivism and Interpretive Theory’, in: D. Marsh and G. Stoker (editors), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Great Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 80-98. Pierce, D. (2008). Research Methods in Politics, London, Sage, pp. 41-45. Sanders, D. (2010). ‘Behavioural Analysis’, in: D. Marsh and G. Stoker (editors), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Great Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 24.
Since its conception as a formal academic discipline, Politics has existed on the fault line between two great fields of enquiry, the sciences and the arts. During the mid 20th century, with the rise of the behavioural movement, a general trend towards the “scientification” of the study of politics could be observed. The origins of this movement can be traced back to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and the writings of Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century (Sanders, 2010). However from the 1970s, there emerged a growing dissatisfaction with behaviouralism and a revival of interest in normative questions, as seen in the writings of theorists such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick (Heywood, 2002). This debate over the nature of politics, which is reflected in the different stages of development of the discipline, continues till date. But before we can decide which position is more relevant, it is important to clarify the distinction between the science of politics and the art of politics. Those who consider the study of politics as a science and those who consider it an art, pursue slightly different aims and apply different methodologies (Berlin, 1979). As Leftwich (2004) puts it, “the study of politics [as] a scientific endeavour... seeks to identify, on an explanatory and probabilistic basis, some general regularities, patterns and processes (if not laws) underlying all politics....”; whereas, “the study of politics [as] a more humanistic, historical, normative and hence non - scientific exercise, [is] concerned with the qualitative understanding and evaluative analysis (and moral judgement) of particular processes at particular times and in particular places.” Leftwich is distinguishing between the arts and sciences by pointing out the difference in their purposes and their aims of enquiry. Science is concerned with identifying repetitive patterns and thereby outlining laws which are universally applicable i.e. can be adapted to all situations. In contrast, art concerns itself with more in-depth analysis of a particular situation and attempts to find solutions particular to that historical or cultural context.
It is evident that an important aspect of the scientific study of politics requires the political scientist to provide descriptions that are generalizable beyond a particular case. The aim here is to use different variables to derive causal relationships which remain constant in any situation. This is done with an eye towards reliability and replication (Bond, 2007). While this process seems to have a wider significance and credibility than art, as art does not appear to be providing any broad solution beyond isolated case studies, science may in effect be restricting the scope of politics. An essential component of science is that another researcher, following the same procedure, is able to arrive at the same result. However, political and social events involve complex human behaviour and interactions which are often autonomous and cannot be viewed as simply reactive to independent variables. Science rests on the principle of rationality and consequently cannot account for the apparent unpredictability of human choices. Further it underestimates the intervention of memory, goal seeking, problem solving etc between the independent and dependent variables. People as a group evolve through a continuous process of learning and causal relationships change simultaneously because, unlike the physical world, the political world is rarely static in the long run. This inherent instability of variables in the social scenario renders the search for regularities or lawful relationships, which was a remarkable success in the natural sciences, an exercise in futility when it comes to explaining social outcomes. In the political arena, this strategy can only hope to explain, at most, some of the conditions which affect these outcomes (Almond and Genco, 1977). In comparison, the constructivist approach (which can be considered an art) incorporates not only the shifting landscape of the social world, but also contingency and human agency into its account (Parsons, 2010).
In addition to the difference of purpose between arts and sciences, which we have discussed above, a further distinction is offered by Lasswell (1958) that may be considered by some as somewhat biased: “The science of politics states conditions; the philosophy of politics justifies preferences.” He distinguishes between “the science of politics” and “the philosophy of politics” on the same grounds as the fact-value dichotomy of logical positivism. He appears to be implying that political philosophy (which, for the purpose of this essay, would fall under the jurisdiction of art) “justifies preferences” in the sense that it provides rationalizations for the personal preferences of the theorist of political philosophy (Horwitz, 1962). Science, on the other hand, uses only facts and empirical data as its tools of analysis. This overt process of analysis minimizes the scope for bias by the researcher (Pierce, 2008). Moreover it promises an impartial and reliable means of distinguishing ‘truth’ from ‘falsehood’ and gives us access to objective knowledge about the political world (Heywood, 2002). However the fact/value dichotomy is not as clearly defined as is assumed here. Values are deeply involved in the identification of facts as well as their description and examination since all political scientists enter research with at least some presumptions about their subject. Hence, it is never entirely possible to reach absolute neutrality in politics. The ambivalence of the fact-value dichotomy leads us to another difficulty. Political activity does not occur in a vacuum or the controlled environment of a scientist’s laboratory. Political decisions do not merely involve objective data, but also value judgements about man and society. Science can facilitate in the critical assessment of these decisions by separating value based elements from the objective elements, thereby making the terms of the choice clear, but it cannot choose (Duverger, 1966). Political scientists only study ‘the how’ and ‘the why’ of political processes and make no effort to answer how these ‘should’ be or present normative statements. So is empirical data, by itself, sufficient for the study of politics? Or are normative statements, which science rejects as being subjective and biased, perhaps an indispensable component of political studies?
This brings us to perhaps the most important or at least the most discernible distinction between the sciences and humanities – the variation in methodology. While art lends itself to a highly qualitative method of research, science tends to use more quantitative methods, to the extent that all facts are usually supported by statistics or numerical data. The use of numeric indicators and large samples makes quantitative research appear more convincing and its findings are generally regarded as consistent and credible. It cannot be denied that quantitative methods decrease the probability of human fallacy and misinterpretations which are common with qualitative methods. Nevertheless, unlike natural science, political science is unable to achieve absolute accuracy. Also it increases the likelihood of manipulation of results as political scientists can fairly easily use a deductive strategy to manoeuvre statistics in a way that verifies their hypothesis. Another problem with quantitative research in politics is that all political concepts cannot be numerically measured. Ideas such as justice and liberty, which form a crucial part of political culture, do not have any predetermined indicators that can be measured using scientific means and thus remain solely within the fold of qualitative research or art. Despite continuous debate throughout the history of the discipline, it is apparent that the scientific study of politics and the artistic study of politics do not always have clear boundaries. Facts in political science cannot claim to be entirely detached from values and art has, perhaps due to its flexibility, been rather influenced by science and often uses facts generated by political science. However art and science, to a large extent, still have very disparate methodologies and pursue dissimilar aims. Science uses only empirical data and overlooks all concepts which do not have numeric indicators and hence cannot be measured quantitatively. While this approach reduces the probability of research bias, it also curtails the scope of political studies. So in practice it appears that, rather than focusing on the issue at hand, science chooses its subject matter in accordance to the requirements of its methodology. In contrast, art uses qualitative research which is more encompassing and studies both observable as well as hidden social phenomena, thus allowing theorists to concentrate on the given issue which, in my opinion, takes precedence over the requirements of methodology. Furthermore, science concludes its investigation at the phase where political concerns are identified and predicted without even attempting to give solutions to the problems it detects. Conceivably, such methods are sufficient if the only purpose of research is to satisfy the curiosity of the researcher, but insofar as the study of politics is intended for the progress of society, it requires a normative component. Art offers precisely that by acting as a guide to policymakers and supplying possible resolutions to the myriad problems facing society today. So I would conclude by suggesting that, despite the prevailing scientific outlook, the study of politics as an art is far more relevant and conducive to the present scenario than the study of politics as a science.
Bibliography
Almond, G. and Genco, S. (1977), ‘Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics’, World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 489-522. Berlin, I. (1979). Against the Current, London, The Hogarth Press, pp. 80-111. Bond, J. R. (2007). ‘The Scientification of the Study of Politics: Some Observations on the Behavioral Evolution in Political Science’, Journal of Politics, November, Vol. 69, Issue 4, pp. 897-907. Duverger, M. (1966). The Idea of Politics, London, Methuen, pp. ix-xiii. Heywood, A. (2002). Politics, Great Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 14-17. Horwitz, R. (1962). ‘Scientific Propaganda: Harold D. Lasswell’, in: H. J. Storing (editor), Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., pp. 225-304. Lasswell, H. (1958). Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?, New York, McGraw-Hill, p. 3. Leftwich, A. (2004). What is Politics?, Oxford, Polity Press, p. 5. Parsons, C. (2010). ‘Constructivism and Interpretive Theory’, in: D. Marsh and G. Stoker (editors), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Great Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 80-98. Pierce, D. (2008). Research Methods in Politics, London, Sage, pp. 41-45. Sanders, D. (2010). ‘Behavioural Analysis’, in: D. Marsh and G. Stoker (editors), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Great Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 24.
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