Procedural Posture
Petitioner attorney sought review of a recommendation by respondent Board of Governors of the State Bar of California (board) that the attorney be disbarred. The attorney alleged that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the findings that he violated Cal. Bar R., Prof. Conduct R. 2, 3. The law of discharge firearm is PC 246 with detail. A person wilfully breached his oath never to mislead any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(d).
Overview
The attorney allowed a bail bondsman to solicit cases for him, one of which was defending a man accused in another state of a narcotics charge. The attorney lied to the client about the fee arrangement made with his family and also lied to the sentencing judge that the client had never been in trouble before. The court found that the evidence sustained the findings of the board that the attorney had violated Cal. Bar R., Prof. Conduct R. 2, 3, and wilfully breached his oath never to mislead any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(d). The court also found that the attorney's acquittal of conspiracy to commit grand theft and grand theft had not divested the state bar of jurisdiction to discipline the attorney under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6075 et seq. The acquittal did not constitute a bar to the institution of disbarment proceedings based upon the same acts. Last, the penalty was not found to be excessive. The court found that the board had taken into consideration not only that the attorney had previously been reprimanded for soliciting, but also that he had made false representations to a judge.
Outcome
The court approved the recommendation of the board and ordered that the attorney be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of the state.
Procedural Posture
Plaintiff merchant appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County (California), which sustained demurrers filed by defendants, a bank, its registered agents, and its parent holding company, ruling that federal law preempted the merchant's action, brought under California's unfair competition law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and ruling that the merchant did not allege facts demonstrating the parent company's liability.
Overview
The merchant started a work-at-home business involving grocery coupons. To process customers' credit cards, the merchant obtained a merchant account from the bank. The court held that the termination fee in the merchant agreement was not a liquidated damage under Cal. Civ. Code § 1671. The merchant never agreed not to terminate the merchant agreement; in fact, the lack of any specified duration in the merchant agreement made payment of the termination fee inevitable. Thus, the fee was merely a deferred charge attendant to initiating the account. The merchant failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate unconscionability under Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5. The merchant failed to allege he could not have obtained merchant credit card services from another source on different terms. The merchant did not allege that he was unaware of the fee when he executed the merchant agreement or that its terms were misrepresented to him. The fee was not substantively unconscionable because it did not reallocate the risk of the bargain in an inappropriate manner. Remand was appropriate to give the merchant the opportunity to plead facts demonstrating unconscionability.
Outcome
The court reversed the judgment and remanded to allow the merchant the opportunity to plead facts stating a cause of action under the UCL. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the parent company.
